Cybersecurity-linked satellite disruptions threaten trade, finance, and transport; resilience planning and regional cooperation will need to become essential priorities.

From guiding tankers through the Malacca Strait to supporting aircraft navigation across the Pacific ocean, orbital systems have become embedded in critical infrastructure. In practice, many societies in the region now depend on space‑based services, even if that dependence is not always visible.

While the “space race” to launch satellites receives the most attention, a less visible priority is for governments and businesses to ensuring continuity of service when signals are disrupted.

The growth of satellite‑dependent systems has introduced new single points of failure into infrastructure. In the coming decade, a key challenge will be managing the consequences of temporary or prolonged disconnection from space‑based systems.

Cyber fragility of the space chain

Interference and cyberattacks targeting space systems are no longer confined to science fiction. Jamming and spoofing of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals have increased in frequency, with effects that extend beyond the space sector itself.

n August 2025, GPS signals for European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s aircraft were reportedly jammed, forcing pilots to revert to manual navigation using paper charts. The incident highlighted that even high‑security assets can be affected by disruptions to satellite‑based positioning and timing.

Similar patterns have been observed elsewhere. In the first four months of 2025, more than 123,000 flights in the Baltic region had experienced GPS interference, with the share of affected flights reaching nearly 28% in April. For a region like APAC, where maritime and air corridors are central to trade, a widespread GNSS blackout would affect more than consumer services; it could disrupt automated ports and complicate the operation of global supply chains.

Furthermore, despite growing reliance on orbital assets, preparedness for signal loss remains uneven across the region. In practice, any organization that relies on cloud computing, global logistics, or time‑synchronized financial records is also a user of space‑based infrastructure. When the signal fails, not all of these organizations will have manual or alternative systems in place.

Amid an assumption that, because a company does not own satellites, it bears limited responsibility for their security, gaps in accountability can arise, with neither satellite operators nor end‑users taking full ownership of digital‑defense measures. Responses to space‑related disruptions also remain fragmented. While a traditional bank hack typically triggers established incident‑response protocols, a jammed or hijacked satellite often falls into a gray area. In a crisis, the absence of a common framework among government agencies, military commands, and private‑sector technology leaders can slow coordination and decision‑making.

Building resilience in critical space infrastructure

Governments in APAC may need to invest more in ensuring the resilience of the space-based services they provide. One practical step could be to institutionalize widespread drills involving operational stress tests designed to reveal hidden dependencies on orbital assets:

• Much like financial stress tests, such drills would simulate a complete loss of satellite data for a defined period. If critical systems cannot function without a space‑based link for 24 hours, that would indicate a need for additional redundancy or alternative procedures.
• Another step could be to align space‑security language with existing cybersecurity frameworks. Space security shares many characteristics with terrestrial cybersecurity, and many of the same principles — such as robust encryption and identity verification — apply to systems in orbit as well as on the ground.
• Cross‑border collaboration will add to the impetus. A satellite passes over multiple jurisdictions, and its security cannot be managed by any single country alone. Regional cooperation to share threat‑intelligence data and coordinate responses could help reduce response times and improve situational awareness.

Innovation without resilience carries risks as well as benefits. If APAC aims to play a leading role in the global digital economy, it will need to treat the protection of space‑based assets as seriously as the protection of terrestrial infrastructure. The ability to withstand disruptions in orbit could become as important as the ability to operate in it.