Not if the industry learns from the tactics and tips offered here for a start…

When execTransaction is triggered on a proxy contract, it forwards this call to the master copy, also known as the singleton. This is achieved using the delegatecall operation in the Solidity smart contract programming language, enabling the execution of the master copy’s code within the proxy’s storage context. Then:

  • The execTransaction function, as defined in the singleton contract, ensures that transactions are only executed after receiving the requisite approvals from the designated number of owners, verified through their signatures. It also efficiently manages gas payments, ensuring that all transaction costs are adequately covered and refunds are issued where necessary. Furthermore, this function is enhanced by integration with guard contracts, which perform additional security checks. This setup creates a secure and efficient framework for handling multi-signature transactions.
  • The process involves a call to the Gnosis Safe executor contract. This contract is specifically designed to facilitate transaction execution on behalf of the Safe. Within this contract, the execute function is triggered, which in turn calls the Safe MultiSend contract.
  • The Safe MultiSend contract is a crucial component of the Gnosis Safe framework. It enables the bundling of multiple transactions into a single operation, much like the aggregate function in Uniswap. This capability is highly beneficial for enhancing efficiency and minimizing gas costs when several actions need to be executed concurrently. Analyzing the data directed to the MultiSend function reveals that it processes three transferFrom requests involving the token “Umbrella” from the victim, allowing the attacker to drain the tokens from the victim’s wallet. This hack sets a new precedent in crypto security by bypassing a multisig cold wallet without exploiting any smart contract vulnerability. Instead, it exploited human trust and UI deception. Conclusions:

    ▶ Multisigs are no longer a security guarantee if signers can be compromised

    ▶ Cold wallets are not automatically safe if an attacker can manipulate what a signer sees

    ▶ Supply chain and UI manipulation attacks are becoming more sophisticated

    ▶ Even with airtight technical defenses, human error remains the biggest vulnerability. This attack highlights how tactics such as UI manipulation and social engineering can compromise even the most secure wallets

Oded Vanunu, CPR’s Head of Products Vulnerability Research,

  1. Comprehensive security measures: Firms holding significant crypto assets need to integrate traditional security products, such as endpoint threat prevention and email security, to prevent malware from infecting sensitive machines and spreading throughout the organization. This is crucial to safeguard against sophisticated attacks that exploit human vulnerabilities and user interface manipulation.
  2. Real-time prevention: The industry needs a paradigm shift from incremental security improvements to real-time prevention. Just as corporate networks and clouds use firewalls to inspect every packet, Web3 requires real-time inspection of every transaction to ensure security. This approach can prevent malicious activities before they cause damage.
  3. Implement Zero Trust security: Every signer’s device should be treated as potentially compromised. Use dedicated, air-gapped signing devices for multisig approvals. Require signers to cross-verify transaction details via a second independent channel